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If we put all together that the school-boy rehearses, that the
crowd relates, and that the philosopher demonstrates about spirits,
this would seem to constitute no small part of our knowledge. Nevertheless, I dare assert that all these smatterers could be placed in a most
awkward embarrassment, if it should occur to somebody to insist upon
the question, just what kind of a thing that is about which these people
think they understand so much.
-Kant, Dreams of a Spirit Seer1
In the zones of the Americas where plantation slavery formed an
economic base built over three centuries, roughly from 1550–1850, to
provision European colonies with cheap labor in the production of
brazilwood, cacao, indigo, cotton, tobacco, and above all sugar, certain
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1. IMMANUEL KANT, DREAMS OF A SPIRIT SEER 41 (1900) (1766).
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patterns emerged.2 Antonio Benítez-Rojo gathered them under the
phrase, “the repeating island” in order to give emphasis to the relative
uniformity of the plantation economy and its human machinery across
the archipelago in spite of differences in language, geography, and culture.3 I expand on his idea of a repeating morphology to also include
the religious practices performed by slaves and their descendants, and
the techniques of their control or suppression as applied by colonial
governance. One of the regularities on the so-called repeating island
was that Afro-Atlantic practices took shape as systems, traditions, or
“thinly coherent” cultures within and alongside colonial Christianities—Protestant in the Dutch or British colonies and Catholic in the
domains of Portugal, France, or Spain.4 A second recurring feature was
that Afro-Atlantic religions launched under plantation slavery often included ritual events evoking collective states which colonial officials,
then criminologists and doctors, and finally psychiatrists and anthropologists, all described as “possession.”5 A third regularity was that
rituals where such spirit-possession events took place were rigorously
policed and legally repressed. In the history of European encounters
with peoples of Africa and the Americas, spirit-possessed action came
to be viewed as the opposite of individual action—accountable, contract-worthy, transparent, and properly civil action—in early modern
social theories that became the template for political states in the
Americas.6 Even more, the figure of “the possessed” helped define the
2. See Ralph Lee Woodward, Jr., The Political Economy of the Caribbean, THE 1996
PORTER L. FORTUNE, JR. SYMP., (Oct. 4, 1996). The precise duration of the plantation form
varies case by case: In Brazil, for example, enslaved Africans are first debarked in the 16th
century, and slavery was officially abolished in 1888. See The Lei Aurea of 1888 (Golden
Law) (abolishing slavery in Brazil).
3. ANTONIO BENÍTEZ-ROJO, THE REPEATING ISLAND 8 (1996). “We can speak, nevertheless, of a Caribbean machine as important or more so than the fleet machine. This machine,
this extraordinary machine, exists today, that is, it repeats itself continuously. It’s called: the
plantation.” Id. Benítez-Rojo described the main function of the Caribbean plantation system
as the transformation of nature into capital, and its transfer from the Caribbean archipelago to
European metropoli. Id.
4. See William H. Sewell, The Concept(s) of Culture, in BEYOND THE CULTURAL TURN:
NEW DIRECTIONS IN THE STUDY OF SOCIETY AND CULTURE 35, 49, 52 (1999) (discussing the
“thin coherence” of a cultural symbol system).
5. Paul Christopher Johnson, An Atlantic Genealogy of “Spirit Possession,” 53 Comparative Stud. in Society & History 393, 395–396, 400, 407–408, 418 (2011). Spirit possession
refers to the notion that an outside agent can occupy the body of a living human being and act
through that body. Spirit possession involves beliefs, practices, social events, and religious
institutions devoted to cultivating the incorporation of spirits by participants. This complex
has long been considered a frequent component of African and Afro-Atlantic religions.
6. Many scholars questioned the legal premise of the autonomous, free, individual whatsoever. See, e.g., TALAL ASAD, Trying to Understand French Secularism, in POLITICAL
THEOLOGIES 494, 523 (2006) (stating “[t]he liberal idea is that it is only when this individual
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proper sort of individual in relation to which civil participation in
emergent states was imagined at all, beginning with the writings of
Thomas Hobbes and John Locke in the mid-17th century.7 These political philosophers tried to imagine and then describe the personhood
that modern nation-states would need in order to survive and thrive.
“Citizens” needed to be free, autonomous, rational individuals with
durable identities; only such would be capable of making, guaranteeing, and fulfilling trustworthy contracts that nation-states founded on
principles of private property would require. Certain forms of religion
enabled and fortified the proper individualism—Protestantism above
all—while others threatened to undermine it. African and Afro-Atlantic practices that appeared to generate non-rational states of possession
were regarded as socially and politically dangerous; at best, productive
of the worst form of shifty, intemperate, and impermanent persons and
at worst, sedition, or revolution.
Under French slave laws decreed in 1685 by Louis XIV as the
“Code Noir” (Black Code), to take a prominent example, all slaves had
to be baptized as Roman Catholic, and the practice of any other religion was prohibited.8 African religions were especially feared as potential sources of slave insurrections, and ritual gatherings that produced states of possession were especially regarded as potential
dangers. The Revolution in Haiti,9 and the reports of a ritual pact that
generated it, gave evidence that possession rituals could foment violent

sovereignty is invaded by something other than the representative democratic state, which
represents his individual will collectively, and by something other than the market, which is
the state’s dominant civil partner (as well as its indispensable electoral technique), that free
choice gives way to coerced behavior…”); BRUNO LATOUR, ON THE MODERN CULT OF THE
FACTISH GODS 11 (2010) (stating “[n]either anti-fetishists nor fetishists know who acts and
who is mistaken about the origins of action, who is master and who is alienated or possessed”).
7. See, e.g., Thomas Hobbes’ 1651 book Leviathan frequently invoked the threat of
possession and other “enthusiast” religious experiences to the notion of rational citizenship
that the modern nation-state would require. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 57 (1987) (stating
“[a]nd for that part of Religion , which consisteth in opinions concerning the nature of Powers
Invisible, there is almost nothing that has a name, that has not been esteemed amongst the
Gentiles, in one place or another, a God, or Divell; or by their Poets feigned to be inanimated,
inhabited, or possessed by some Spirit or other”).
8. SUE PEABODY & KEILA GRINBERG, SLAVERY, FREEDOM, AND THE LAW IN THE
ATLANTIC WORLD: A BRIEF HISTORY WITH DOCUMENTS 31–36 (2007); Le Code Noir [C. Noir]
[Black Code] Mar. 1685, art. 2, 3 (Fr.).
9. The Revolution against the French colony of Saint Domingue was launched in 1791
and culminated with the 1804 declaration of a new state called by the indigenous name for
mountainous place, “Haiti.” LAURENT DUBOIS, A COLONY OF CITIZENS: REVOLUTION AND
SLAVE EMANCIPATION IN THE FRENCH CARIBBEAN, 1787–1804, 107–112, 320, 441 (2004).
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rebellion.10 Afro-Atlantic possession practices were policed and legally repressed more aggressively than ever. Laws regulating religious
practices of slaves were enacted across the Caribbean basin, from Surinam to Cuba, and from Trinidad to Brazil. Beginning in the 18th century, slaves’ religions in British colonies were regulated by AntiWitchcraft Laws.11 In Jamaica and Trinidad, anti-Obeah Acts were
passed in 1816 and in 1898 to curtail African healing practices; there
were likewise prohibitions against Shouters, or Spiritual Baptists, after
1916.12 In 20th century Haiti, Vodou was legally attacked by North
Americans under Penal Code Laws 405-7 against sortilèges (“spells”)
even as Vodou was luridly fantasized about, and not seldom enjoined,
during the U.S. occupation of Haiti from 1915 to 1934, spawning a
wave of Hollywood horror movies on “voodoo” and zombies when
those Marines returned home.13
In Brazil, a less dramatic story about the repression and freedom of

10. The Revolution was said to have begun in a ritual event. The event was a legendary
Vodou ceremony held at Bois Caiman, the Alligator Woods, on or around August 14, 1791.
The main sources are Antoine Dalma’s History of the Revolution, published in 1814, but supposedly written in 1793–1794, and an oral report from a mulatto woman named Cecile Fatiman, a priestess (manbo) who was at the event (as told to her grandson and thence to Etienne
Charlier, who published it). See ANTOINE DALMAS, HISTOIRE DE LA REVOLUTION DE SAINTDOMINGUE XX (1977); ETIENNE D. CHARLIER, APERÇU SUR LA FORMATION HISTORIQUE DE LA
NATION HAÏTIENNE XX (1954); DAVID PATRICK GEGGUS, HAITIAN REVOLUTIONARY STUDIES
81, 82 (2002). To say that a ritual directly motivated the rebellion is speculation, but among
Haitians the Vodou ritual is popularly viewed as the spur of the Revolution. See DUBOIS, supra
note 9, at 432.
11. PAUL CHRISTOPHER JOHNSON, Introduction, in SPIRITED THINGS: THE WORK OF
“POSSESSION” IN AFRO-ATLANTIC RELIGIONS 1, 9 (2014); see also An Act to Remedy the Evils
arising from Irregular Assemblies of Slaves, Jamaica, 1760, TNA CO 139/21 (where Obeah,
a kind of sorcery in the Caribbean, became illegal).
12. See DIANA PATON, NO BOND BUT THE LAW: PUNISHMENT, RACE AND GENDER IN
JAMAICAN STATE FORMATION (2004); see also Sasha Turner Bryson, The Art of Power: Poison
and Obeah Accusations and the Struggle for Dominance and Survival in Jamaica’s Slave Society, 41 CARIBBEAN STUD. 61, 65 (2013).
13. See generally DIANA PATON, THE CULTURAL POLITICS OF OBEAH 41, 143 f.164 (2015)
(discussing anti-Obeah acts in Jamaica and Trinidad); REINALDO L. ROMÁN, GOVERNING
SPIRITS: RELIGION, MIRACLES, AND SPECTACLES IN CUBA AND PUERTO RICO, 1898–1956
(2007). On Haiti see KATE RAMSEY, THE SPIRITS AND THE LAW: VODOU AND POWER IN HAITI
13, 120 (2011) (discussing anti-Obeah acts and anti-Shouters acts in Haiti); Michael Norton,
Haiti Officially Sanctions Voodoo, Midland Reporter Telegram (Apr. 10, 2003),
http://www.mrt.com/import/article_8c236da5-fdb8-57ed-837c-8b2512ed55f3.html (reporting how Vodou became a bona fide, fully legal “religion” endowed with official state powers
to marry and bury, on April 4, 2003, under President Aristide). The most famous of the early
horror movies featuring Vodou was the 1943 hit, “I Walked With a Zombie.” Others were
“Voodoo Island” (1941), and “Voodoo Man” starring Bela Lugosi (1944). I WALKED WITH A
ZOMBIE (RKO Radio Pictures, Inc. 1943); VOODOO ISLAND (Oak Pictures, Inc. 1957); Voodoo
Man (Banner Productions 1944).
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religion unfolded. During most of the colonial period, Afro-Brazilian
religions were classified as fetishism (feitiçaria) or witchcraft, and regulated under the Portuguese Philippine Code (Ordenações Filipinas),
named for the Spanish King Phillip who ruled Portugal and announced
the code in 1602.14 The Portuguese Inquisition also levied punishments
against feitiçaria. In the early 19th century, with Brazil’s independence
(1822) new laws on religion came into effect, lasting until emancipation in 1888.15 For example, from 1830, the Criminal Code (Chapter
1, Article 276) levied consequences for offenses against “religion, morality and good custom,” which included any religious practice not
viewed as Catholic.
The transition from the Monarchy to new Republic, in 1890,
brought with it another key shift, namely the declaration of freedom of
religion and the official separation of church and state. These were announced in the Decree 119A of January 7, 1890, and ratified in the
Constitution of 1891.16 Freedom of religion was an ideal only partly
realized.17 For example, members of monastic orders requiring vows
14. ORDENAÇÕES FILIPINAS [C. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] book V, title III (1602) (Braz.). “On
Fetishists,” prohibits the invocation of spirits and the use of material artifacts to this end.
15. Prior to its modern applications by Karl Marx and then Sigmund Freud, fetishism
referred to illegitimate religious practices. It stemmed from the Portuguese word feitiço, meaning an object made by a human hand, and used by the Portuguese to describe African uses of
ritual objects on the west coast of Africa beginning in the late fifteenth century. By 1600 the
word was au courant across European languages, as it was used by the Dutchman Pieter de
Marees to describe practices on the Gold Coast, roughly today’s Ghana, in his description from
1602. In 1760, the French scholar Charles de Brosses coined the term f. . .tichisme, still using
descriptions of the Gold Coast and Dahomey as his main exemplars. See PIETER DE MAREES,
DESCRIPTION AND HISTORICAL ACCOUNT OF THE GOLD KINGDOM OF GUINEA (1602); CHARLES
DE BROSSES, DU CULTE DES DIEUX FÉTICHES, OU PARALLÈLE DE L’ANCIENNE RELIGION DE
L’EGYPTE AVEC LA RELIGION ACTUELLE DE NIGRITIE (1760). See generally William Pietz, The
Problem of the Fetish, I, 9 RES: Anthropology and Aesthetics 5 (1985); William Pietz, The
Problem of the Fetish, II, 13 RES: Anthropology and Aesthetics 23 (1987); William Pietz, The
Problem of the Fetish, IIIa: Bosmann’s Guinea and the Enlightenment Theory of Fetishism,
16 RES: Anthropology and Aesthetics 105 (1988) (describing the genealogy of fetishism as a
religious problematic).
16. CONSTITUIÇÃO 1891 [CONSTITUTION] art. LXXII, §3 (Braz.) (stating “[a]ll individuals
and religious confessions may publically and freely practice their religion, associate for this
reason, and acquire property to this end” (“Todos os individuos e confissões religiosas podem
exercer publica e livremente o seu culto, associando-se para esse fim adquirindo bens, observadas as disposições do direito commum.”).
CONSTITUIÇÃO 1891 [CONSTITUTION] art. LXXII §7 (Braz.) (declaring the separation of
church and state as “[n]o religion or church will benefit from official support or have any
relation of dependence or alliance with the federal government or its states”(“Nenhum culto
ou igreja gozará de subvenção official, nem terá relações de dependencia, ou alliança com o
Governo da União, ou o dos Estados.”).
17. This is the case in every nation-state; freedom of religion is always and necessarily
only partly realized. E.g., WINNIFRED FALLERS SULLIVAN, THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF RELIGIOUS
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of obedience were prohibited from voting, since they had renounced
their autonomy as individuals.18 Freedom of religion was especially
restricted, however, in regard to Afro-Brazilian traditions. New legal
controls of Africans and Afro-Brazilians were established only months
after the declaration of religious freedom, serving as “clawback”
mechanisms to restrict Afro-Brazilian ritual practices.19 Decree 528 of
June 28, 1890, prohibited African immigration.20 Law 173 of 1893 set
limits on religious associations, requiring all congregations to be registered with the state, and requiring them to refrain from promoting
“illicit” or “immoral” ends.21 The Penal Code of 1890 interdicted “pretending” to be a religious leader for monetary or other gain, a crime
that could implicate virtually any non-Catholic priest.22
But most important of all among these clawback laws was the addition to the Penal Code in 1890 of three new articles, numbers 156,
157, and 158. Article 156 prohibited illegal medicine.23 Article 157
prohibited “the practice of spiritism, magic and its sorceries, talismans
and cartomancy to arouse sentiments of hate and love, the promise to
cure illnesses, curable and not curable; in sum, to fascinate and subjugate public belief.”24 Article 158 proscribed “administering, or simply
prescribing any substance of the natural domains for internal or external use, or in any way prepared, thus performing or exercising the office denominated as curandeiro.”25 Roughly speaking, Article 156 restricted healing practices, Article 157 prohibited the invocation of

FREEDOM (2005).
18. CONSTITUIÇÃO 1891 [CONSTITUTION] art. LXX, §4 (Braz.).
19. YVONNE MAGGIE, MEDO DO FEITIÇO: RELAÇÕES ENTRE MAGIA E PODER NO BRASIL
(1992); EMERSON GIUMBELLI, O CUIDADO DOS MORTOS: UMA HISTÓRIA DA CONDENAÇÃO E
LEGITIMAÇÃO DO ESPIRITISMO (1995); PAUL CHRISTOPHER JOHNSON, SECRETS, GOSSIP AND
GODS: THE TRANSFORMATION OF BRAZILIAN CANDOMBL . . . (2002).
20. Decreto no. 528, de 28 de Junio de 1890, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U] de
28.6.1890 (Braz.).
21. Decreto no. 173, de 10 de Setembro de 1893, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U] de
10.9.1893 (Braz.).
22. Decreto no. 847, de 11 de Outubro de 1890, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U] de
11.10.1890 (Braz.) (stating it is to a crime to “[p]retend to be a minister of a religious confession or exercise functions as such for financial gain or any other use. (“Fingir-se ministro de
qualquer confissão religiosa e exercer as funcções respectivas para obter de outrem dinheiro
ou utilidade.”).
23. Decreto no. 847, de 11 de Outubro de 1890, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U] de
11.10.1890 (Braz.).
24. Id.
25. Id.; MAGGIE, supra note 19, at 22; GIUMBELLI, supra note 19, at 55; JOHNSON, supra
note 26, at 77, 82.
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spirits or the manufacture of objects understood to have power or mobilize sentiments, and Article 158 repeated 156, specifying the occupation of the usually indigenous or Afro-Brazilian religious healer,
curandeiro. Yet none of these articles were seen as contravening freedom of religion because Afro-Brazilian practices were regarded less as
“religion” than as a hybrid of custom, morality, hygiene and health.26
Afro-Brazilian ritual practices were policed and prosecuted under
these so-called “public health” laws, until 1940.27
Noteworthy is how Afro-Brazilians religions were legally classified as a form of disease afflicting the national body.28 The regulation
of Afro-Brazilian religions was intended to cause their cessation. The
imagined scenario, at least from the perspective of the agents of the
State, was that freed slaves would assimilate and adopt religious identities in keeping with the national form—that is, as Roman Catholic.29
African religions were not viewed as part of the legally protected freedom of religion; instead they were relegated to the alternative legal
track of public health and hygiene law.
In fact, the Afro-Brazilian religion called Candomblé—a tradition
similar to Haitian Vodou or Cuban Santería, which conducts ritual
events in which the gods of West Africa (orixás) are incorporated in
the bodies of devotees—was never fully protected under the 1891 constitutional “freedom of religion” clause until 1976.30 Unlike AfroAmerican religious practices, there was no revolution after which religious freedom was directly bestowed on Afro-Brazilian religions. Rather, over a period of fifty years, spirit possession practices came to
seem familiar and domestic rather than foreign and dangerous. This
26. Paul Christopher Johnson, Law, Religion, and “Public Health” in the Republic of
Brazil, 26 LAW & SOCIAL INQUIRY 9, 15–20 (2001).
27. Id.
28. See, e.g., JURANDIR FREIRE COSTA, ORDEM MÉDICA E NORMA FAMILIAR (1989); Dain
Borges, ‘Puffy, Ugly, Slothful, and Inert’: Degeneration in Brazilian Social Thought, 1880–
1940, 25 J. LATIN AM. STUD. 235 (1993).
29. So, for example, the first medical doctor and criminologist to study Candomblé in any
depth, Raimundo Nina Rodrigues, expressed concern about the degree to which practitioners
of this religion could become legitimately Catholic or Brazilian.
RAIMUNDO NINA RODRIGUES, O ANIMISMO FETICHISTA DOS NEGROS BAHIANOS 15, 28 (1935).
30. For a concise summary of the religion of Candomblé, see JOHNSON, supra note 26, at 35.
On the achievement of freedom of religion for Candomblé, see J. LORAND MATORY, BLACK
ATLANTIC RELIGION: TRADITION, TRANSNATIONALISM AND MATRIARCHY IN THE AFROBRAZILIAN CANDOMBLE 261 (2009). In Haiti, Vodou was not granted full legitimacy as a “religion,” with the right for its priests to legally marry and bury citizens, until 2003, under JeanBertrand Aristide. See Paul Christopher Johnson, Secretism and the Apotheosis of Duvalier,
JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF RELIGION 420, 440 (2006).
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occurred as they were gradually associated with North American and
European practices of Spiritism inspired by the French writer Allan
Kardec.
Spiritism was a new religious movement spawned in the 1850s in
part from technological developments like the telegraph and photography. Its adherents perceived messages from the dead, much as the
telegraph enabled hearing messages from afar. Allan Kardec began
publishing manuals on the techniques of communicating with the dead
in 1857; by 1860 his books were already widely circulating in Brazil
and acquiring a following among elites.31 Like Afro-Brazilian rituals,
Spiritism involved mediumship or spirit possession, yet it came to be
viewed as a legitimate middle-class religion in the first decades of the
20th century. The legitimacy of Spiritism slowly shifted how elites
viewed Afro-Brazilian traditions.32 Mediated and brokered by EuroAmerican Spiritualism and its popular appeal, possession practices became a standard and universally accepted ritual repertory by the mid20th century in Brazil; perhaps even a part of its particular social contract.33
In the following pages, I recount and interpret two kinds of legal
processes and two sets of spirits that appeared in Brazil roughly a century apart, one from 1871 and others from almost a century later, after
the legitimization and normalization of possession practices through
the acceptance and toleration of Spiritism and, later, of Afro-Brazilian
Candomblé. By counter-posing cases from the two periods, I aim to
cast into relief the legal repression of spirit possession, and in the later
case the elevation and even legal uses of spirit possessions. Thus juxtaposed, the cases raise key questions, elaborated in the Discussion
section: What is a “legal person”? What kind of personhood does law
require? The comparison will show that the legal person is a shifting
target. In the first case of an accused Afro-Brazilian priest named Juca
Rosa, his possessed personhood rendered him criminally outside of the
31. ALLAN KARDEC, LE LIVRE DES ESPRITS (1857). On this and other works’ circulation
from France to Brazil, see MARION AUBRÉ E AND FRANÇOIS LAPLANTINE, LA TABLE, LE LIVRE
ET LES ESPRITS: NAISSANCE, EVOLUTION ET ACTUALITÉ DU MOVEMENT SOCIAL SPIRITE ENTRE
FRANCE ET BRÉSIL (1990); DAVID J. HESS, SPIRITS AND SCIENTISTS: IDEOLOGY, SPIRITISM, AND
BRAZILIAN CULTURE 86 (1991).
32. GIUMBELLI, supra note 19, at 229.
33. The Brazilian anthropologist Gilberto Velho, for example, described the familiarity
with the idiom of spirits and spirit-possession as a “strong binding factor” for understanding
otherwise heterogenous Brazilian social experience. See GILBERT VELHO, Unidade e fragmentação em sociedades complexas, in DUAS CONFERÊNCIAS 27, 34, 41 (1992).
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law. He was, so to say, possessed of an illegal personhood. The second
case presented, a set of more recent trials in Brazil involving spirittestimonies have, by contrast, placed possession states at the center of
at least some legal decisions. Spirits and their human mediators have
been used as a potential legal tool and technique of truth-telling. All
the cases involving possession, though, entail and allow a deferral or
complicating of individual accountability, as spirits have variously infiltrated the legal process.
I begin with 1871 and the case of Juca Rosa, a famous Afro-Brazilian “sorcerer” (feitiçeiro). In the second part, I describe several cases
from the 20th and 21st centuries where spirit-testimonies transmitted
in writing by possessed mediums entered into the legal process. In the
concluding discussion, I compare the cases and call attention to the
challenge of discerning and defining the “legal person” in societies
were multi-personated bodies are cultivated.
19TH CENTURY BRAZIL AND THE CASE OF JUCA ROSA
A context of social and national transition
Brazilian trade with states other than Portugal greatly expanded
in 1808, with the opening of Brazilian ports and the loosening of a
strictly enforced mercantile relation with Portugal.34 The charter expanded trade with Great Britain, but in so doing also invited new religious diversity. Protestant and Jewish traders and their descendants
now mixed with Catholics, and debates about a “civil” idea of religion
that would give equal rights to non-Catholics were initiated. Religious
toleration was officially registered in Brazil’s 1824 Constitution, Article 5, in the wake of declaring its independence from Portugal in
1822.35 Still, the 1830 Criminal Code (Article 276) declared the public
display or participation in any religion other than that of the State to be
a crime, and even proscribed the seeking of spiritual “gifts” (graças)
or other religious kinds of authority from outside the State.36 In prac-

34. This decree (carta régia) of January 28, 1808 was promulgated by the Prince-Regent
João VI, as the Decreto de Abertura dos Portos às Nações Amigas (Decree Opening Ports to
Friendly Nations).
35. See JOHNSON, supra note 26 at 77.
36. See 1830 Criminal Code Article 81: ([Under the category of Crimes against the Nation]: Taking recourse of entreaties to spiritual benefits, distinctions or privileges of the Ec-

JOHNSOFINALBOOKPROOF3-16-17

2016]

3/16/2017 3:13 PM

POSSESSED PERSONS AND LEGAL PERSONS IN BRAZIL

189

tice, Catholicism remained in control of virtually all aspects of Brazilian personhood: marrying, burying, and inheritance, but even a subject’s legal existence whatsoever. As the Brazilian historian Keila
Grinberg noted, “In the last instance the Church guarded even the
power to determine the juridical status of a person, since the sole documents of individual registration were produced in the Church—especially baptismal records that in practice served as birth certificates.”37
Afro-Brazilian ritual practices, meanwhile, though operating in the
direct shadow of the Catholic Church and even appropriating Catholicism’s saints, festal days, garments and tools, did not even register in
the constitutional question of religious tolerance. Since 1810 the question of religious liberty had focused mostly on accommodating foreign
Protestants.38 African and Afro-Brazilian slaves underwent nominative
conversions and regularly took part in Catholic saints’ day holidays.39
clesiastic Hierarchy from foreign authorities either within or outside the empire without legitimate permission. (“Recorrer á Autoridade Estrangeira, residente dentro, ou fóra do Imperio,
sem legitima licença, para impetração de graças espirituaes, distincções ou previlegios na
Jerarchia Ecclesiastica, ou para autorização de qualquer acto religioso.”).
Article 276: [under Crimes Against Religion, Morality and Custom] Celebrating a cult or other religion besides that of the State in any house or building that
has the exterior form of a Temple or anywhere in public.
(“Celebrar em casa, ou edificio, que tenha alguma fórma exterior de Templo,
ou publicamente em qualquer lugar, o culto de outra Religião, que não seja a do
Estado.”).
The Criminal Code of 1830 can be consulted at:
http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/leis/lim/lim-16-12-1830.htm (last viewed
on March 2, 2016).
In the Constitution of 1824, freedom of “private” religion, as “domestic cults,”
was promulgated. See Article 5: The Apostolic Roman Catholic Religion will
continue to be the religion of the Empire. All other religions will be permitted in
household or private practice, or in houses designated for this purpose without
any exterior marks of a temple.
(“A Religião Católica Apostólica Romana continuará a ser a religião do
Imp. . .rio. Todas as outras religiões serão permitidas com seu culto dom. . .stico,
ou particular, em casas para isso destinadas, sem forma alguma exterior de templo.”).
The Constitution of 1824 can be consulted at:
http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/Constituicao/Constituicao24.htm (last accessed March
3, 2016).
37. KEILA GRINBERG, CÓDIGO CIVIL E CIDADANIA 38 (2001).
38. Beginning in 1810, Portugal signed a treaty with the British securing freedom of religion in Portuguese lands including Brazil. Protestants were not allowed to build obvious
religious structures or otherwise demonstrate their faith in public, but were otherwise granted
religious liberty. This policy was continued, with some modifications, until the 1891 disestablishment of Catholicism as state religion. See JUSTO GONZÁLEZ AND ONDINA E. GONZÁLEZ,
CHRISTIANITY IN LATIN AMERICA 190 (2007).
39. See, e.g., KATIA M. DE QUEIRÓS MATTOSO, TO BE A SLAVE IN BRAZIL, 1550–1888
127, 128 (1986); JANE LANDERS & BARRY ROBINSON, SLAVES, SUBJECTS, AND SUBVERSIVES:
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Questions of Afro-Brazilian religious freedom were buried in much
broader civil questions of slaves and former slaves’ personhood. If a
slave was a thing and form of property without any legal possibility of
entering into a contract or leveraging a civil action against a citizen,
the question of his or her capacity to engage in legitimate “religion”
was mostly moot.40 Freedom of religion for Afro-Brazilians was inextricably entangled with the history of emancipation.
Unlike Haiti’s or Cuba’s anti-colonial revolutions leading to abolition, Brazil’s transition to emancipation was a long, graduated process. Slave-shipping was officially illegal after 1836, at least “para
inglês ver” (for the English to see), yet it continued with only partial
disruption from the British navy until 1850.41 After 1850, the transAtlantic shipments of African slaves mostly ceased, but the institution
of slavery and the internal trade in slaves continued, a great migration
from the northeastern sugar zones of Bahia and Pernambuco to the burgeoning coffee plantations in the southeastern states of Rio de Janeiro
and São Paulo.42 Many landowners lobbied for resolving the impending labor crisis of abolition with the importation of Chinese “coolies”
who might prove more submissive than Africans, as the British slaving
colonies had done after their 1836 emancipation of slaves in Caribbean
colonies like Jamaica and Trinidad. Other elites argued this would only
deleteriously “mongolize” the Brazilian nation and was a mistake. At
least, they argued, the African and Afro-Brazilian slaves were already
Catholic, and in that sense part of the nation.43
BLACKS IN COLONIAL LATIN AMERICA 113–14 (2006).
40. See GRINBERG, supra note 37, at 48–49. Slaves in Brazil were considered as property
albeit, at least by the later 19th century, inalienable property in the sense that they would cease
to be slaves by virtue of being sold. But beginning in the early 19th century, slaves were on
rare occasions successful in asserting legal personhood: On one slave’s successful freedom
suit in 1813 against a master who had granted emancipation and then rescinded it, see KEILA
GRINBERG, LIBERATA, A LEI DA AMBIGUIDADE—AS AÇÕES DE LIBERDADE DA CORTE DE
APELAÇÃO DO RIO DE JANEIRO NO S. . .CULO XIX (1994). To compare with slightly later cases
in Louisiana and Cuba, see REBECCA J. SCOTT, DEGREES OF FREEDOM: LOUISIANA AND CUBA
AFTER SLAVERY (2008). In the U.S., the problem of slaves’ personhood was famously “solved”
in the U.S. by James Madison, in Federalist No. 54 that characterized slaves’ three-fifths ratio
to describe persons who were also things. See Malick W. Ghachem, The Slave’s Two Bodies;
The Life of an American Legal Fiction, 60 THE WILLIAM AND MARY QUARTERLY 809 (2003).
41. The Eusébio de Queiros Law, passed on September 4, 1850, made the shipping of
enslaved Africans to Brazil illegal.
42. Robert Slenes gives the number of 222,500 slaves transferred internally between
1850–1881. See ROBERT SLENES, The Brazilian Internal Slave Trade, 1850-1888: Regional
Economies, Slave Experience, and the Politics of a Peculiar Market, in THE CHATTEL
PRINCIPLE: INTERNAL SLAVE TRADES IN THE AMERICAS 325, 331 (2004).
43. EMILIA VIOTTI DA COSTA, THE BRAZILIAN EMPIRE: MYTHS AND HISTORIES 149 (2000).
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Slaves who fought in the war against Paraguay from 1865 to 1870
were offered their liberty, and the old institution’s grip was further
shaken with the September 28, 1871 “Law of the Free Womb” (Lei do
Ventre Livre), emancipating children born of enslaved mothers. In
1885, those over 60 years of age were granted their freedom. Total
emancipation was finally decreed by Princess Isabela’s declaration of
the “Golden Law” of 1888.44 If the Golden Law’s arrival was relatively
anti-climactic, this was because Brazil was the last nation of the Americas to abolish slavery, two years after Cuba in 1886, and also because
by 1888 most Afro-descendants in Brazil were already free. For example, in Rio de Janeiro, the capital, between 1849 and 1872 the proportion of slaves declined from 42% to just 18% of a population of around
275,000.45 Such a precipitous decline points to the dramatic social transition then underway in Rio, from a city dependent on slave-labor to a
mostly free city. Paradoxically, though, the arrival of freedom for the
previously enslaved was correlated with increasing police and legal
surveillance of their religious practices.46 The 1870s policing of AfroBrazilian religions often applied 17th century representations of African spirits—a dramatic case of what I will call judicial lag--as the next
section will show.
The Juca Rosa event
At the precise moment the Law of the Free Womb was being
debated, and then passed, the most notorious nineteenth-century case
of illegal fetishism was tried in the imperial city of Rio. The case involved Juca Rosa, a descendant of slaves and a famed Afro-Brazilian
priest in Rio. Rosa was arrested in 1871 and his trial was front-page
news for the duration of the proceedings and long thereafter.47 An anal-

44. See The Lei Aurea of 1888 (“The Golden Law).
45. SIDNEY CHALHOUB, VISÕES DA LIBERDADE 199 (1990).
46. The historian Thomas Holloway found that Afro-Brazilian religions were rarely directly policed in Rio during the 19th century, except when they intruded on “what the white
elite considered a necessary level of social peace and public calm.” The interest in Afro-Brazilian religious practices was mostly a late-19th century phenomenon, roughly correlated with
Abolition. See Thomas H. Holloway, ‘A Healthy Terror’: Police Repression of Capoeiras in
Nineteenth-Century Rio de Janeiro, 69 HISPANIC AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW 645 (1989).
I would argue that the Juca Rosa case marked the beginning of the problematizing of AfroBrazilian religions, as emancipation neared and those religions would become part of the social life of the nation.
47. “Juca Rosa” became the generic name of a type of person. Even two decades after
the case, newspapers invoked the name. See, inter alia, the major Rio newspaper O Paiz, March
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ysis of his arrest and trial will help us focus and clarify issues of possession and personhood that were in play just below the surface of the
law. At stake in 1871 was nothing less than the question of whether,
and how, Afro-Brazilians, slaves and former slaves, could become full
citizens—accountable, contract-worthy, rational, and autonomous, but
also sufficiently loyal to the nation that had enchained them.48 AfroBrazilian slaves and freemen alike were feared and, albeit usually more
circumspectly, often admired for their putative skill in emerging national forms of music, in the martial art/dance form called capoeira, in
magic and seduction, and for their gifts in the ritual arts of possession.
From the perspective of the police and imperial authorities, they demanded reconnaissance and interpretation. State interests were involved in learning to read possession, in seeing and reforming the secret forces that lay under the skin and, toward that end, in
anthropologically documenting and legally reckoning that inner life.
This was the project to which early criminological, anthropological,
medical, and photographic efforts were devoted.49 In the age of gradual
emancipation and the pluralization of the public sphere Afro-Brazilians required strategic assimilation, containment, or marginalization.
Any or all of these scenarios would call for expanded political and
medical surveillance. Gabriela dos Reis Sampaio carefully documented this case, and I make reference to her work while also employing my own reading of the case archive.50
The trial of Jose Sebastião Rosa, known as Juca Rosa, was
among the most sensational of the 19th century, and the public attraction to the case seems to have represented at once fascination and fears
of the pollution of the national body in the period leading to emancipation, as described above. Accused of “charlatanism” and fraud (estelionato), Rosa was alleged to have illegally and immorally profited

26, 1889, p. 1, where, under the story entitled “Scenas Vulgares,” a disreputable but seductively charismatic personage is described as “a Juca.” Even in the 1920s, the newspaper Jornal
do Brasil printed an advertisement for a book entitled, “The Book of Sorcery; or the Science
of Juca Rosa Revealed” (LIVRO DO FEITIÇO, OU A SCIENCIA DE JUCA ROSA REVELADO.) Jornal
do Brasil, May 6, 1924, p. 21.
48. See SIDNEY CHALOUB, VISÕES DA LIBERDADE: UMA HISTÓRIA DAS ÚLTIMAS D. . .CADAS
DA ESCRAVIDÃO NA CORTE (1990).
49. See PAUL CHRISTOPHER JOHNSON, Objects of Possession, in SENSATIONAL RELIGION:
SENSORY CULTURES IN MATERIAL PRACTICE 25 (2014).
50. GABRIELA DOS REIS SAMPAIO. JUCA ROSA: UM PAI-DE-SANTO NA CORTE IMPERIAL
(2007).
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by representing himself as a bearer of false magical powers. The defendant was creole, born in Brazil of an African mother.51 His father
was never identified. In Rosa’s early adult years he earned a living as
a tailor and a coachman. By the 1860s he had acquired a following as
a possession priest of remarkable skill. In his dwelling in a part of the
city known for vice, he received a large clientele that crossed classes
and races, as well as a devoted circle of at least several dozen ritually
initiated “daughters” and “sons.”52 Most of his followers, though, were
women.
In 1870 Rosa was anonymously denounced in a long, 20-page
letter drafted to the Imperial Police and published in a major newspaper, Diário de Notícias.53 The letter was received by the Judge of the
2nd District, Miguel José Tavares, who had recently undertaken a dogged campaign to purge the inner city of its brothels and slums.54 In fact,
he helped 186 female slaves who were forced to prostitute themselves
gain their freedom, arguing successfully before the courts that masters
forfeited their property rights over slaves by prostituting them.55 Judge
Tavares likely envisioned his prosecution of Juca Rosa as part of the
larger mission of eliminating Rio’s underworld prostitution, and for
that reason kept Rosa in jail on scant evidence for a full eight months
during his investigation, even prior to his conviction. In July of 1871,
Juca Rosa was charged with fraud (estelionato, under Penal Code Article 264) and sentenced to six years of prison and hard labor until
1877, after which he disappeared from the public record. Yet for a full
year prior to his sentencing, the story of the celebrity feitiçeiro was
front-page news, not only in Rio but even nationwide. The mere name,

51. While Juca Rosa enjoyed unusual fame, the arrest and prosecution of Afro-Brazilian
priests and priestesses for reasons of illegal sorcery or for fraud was hardly rare.See JOÃO JOSÉ
REIS, DOMINGOS SODRÉ, UM SACERDOTE AFRICANO: ESCRAVIDÃO, LIBERDADE E CANDOMBLÉ NA
BAHIA DO SÉCULO XIX [2008]; and LUIZ ALBERTO ALVES COUCEIRO, PAI GAVIÃO E A COROA
DA SALVAÇÃO (2004); JAMES HOKE SWEET, DOMINGOS ÁLVARES, AFRICAN HEALING, AND THE
INTELLECTUAL HISTORY OF THE ATLANTIC WORLD (2011). The fact that he was born in Brazil
rather than in Africa was important in his sentencing. African-born priests were sometimes
deported back to their countries of origin,cf. the case of Antão Teixeira in Sampaio, supra note
58, at 78, but this possibility never arose in the case file of Juca Rosa.
52. Processo José Sebastião de Rosa, Arquivo Nacional, Corte de Apelação (Court of
Appeals), Rio de Janeiro. Maço (Bundle) 196, caixa (Box) 11139, número 1081, galeria C
(1871).
53. Id.
54. RONALDO VAINFAS, HISTÓRIA E SEXUALIDADE NO BRASIL 160 (1986).
55. Tavares letter of March 18, 1871, in ROBERT CONRAD, CHILDREN OF GOD’S FIRE: A
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF BLACK SLAVERY IN BRAZIL 131–32 (1983).
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“Juca Rosa,” became a type and a fulcrum for gossip about Afro-Brazilian religions and their place in the emerging public sphere, such that
we should consider Juca Rosa as an “event” extending well beyond the
parameters of his specific case.56
Central to this event were issues of class, sex, religion, and race.
The public was fascinated by the accusations of Jose’s deflowering of
white women, and his marriage to a Portuguese senhora, and indeed, it
was the reports of these alliances that prompted the anonymous denunciation and motivated the initial inquest.57 Beyond the specter of interracial sex, the fact that Rosa was routinely possessed by “foreign” spirits was a subject of special concern to investigators.58 As one journalist
put it, “The sorcerer says he is inspired by an invisible power that is
not God, nor any saint known to us.”59 A public prosecutor involved
in the case, Antonio de Paula Ramos, accused Juca Rosa of presenting
himself as master of supernatural powers. Dressed in a “special manner” before the altar of Our Lady of the Conception, he celebrated
crude ceremonies. He claimed to be inspired and infallible by virtue of
this illuminated state—with “saint in the head”60—and received money
and presents as a result of this special status. Through claims of spirit
knowledge, he “deceived uncultivated, weak and superstitious spirits
[of his followers].”61 Here then was a subversive social “adventurer,”62
as he was called, taking over the national body by sabotaging its rational direction and assuming its controls from within during a period
of radical change
The prosecution’s focus on Juca Rosa’s involvement with spirits, and spirit possession, was tenacious. Neither Judge Tavares nor the
public prosecutor showed much interest in other features of ritual performance.63 They demanded no information on lyrics of the songs that

56. Supra, note 55.
57. Processo José Sebastião de Rosa, supra note 52.
58. Id.
59. “The sorcerer has power over everything, because his ‘saint’ [spirit] knows everything, hear’s everything and tells of it . . .The sorcerer claims to be inspired by an invisible
power that is not God, nor any saint that we know.” (“O feiticeiro . . . para tudo tem poder,
porque o seu santo tudo sabe, tudo ouve e tudo conta…O feiticeiro diz-se inspirado por um
poder invisível que não é Deus, nem santo do nosso conhecimento.”) Diário de Notícias, October 2, 1870. Cited in Sampaio, supra note 50 at 40.
60. Id. at 104a.
61. Processo José Sebastião de Rosa, supra note 52 at 63.
62. Id. at 12.
63. Id. at 67b.
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were sung, for example, or the ingredients of the foods that were prepared and offered to the saints. Descriptions of drums and icons appear
to enter the record in only cursory ways, as placeholders in a standard
caricature of primitive fetishism.64 The investigation remained resolutely focused on Juca’s posturing as a spirit-holder, and the kind of
power with which that role endowed him. They wanted to know how,
by virtue of receiving “saints in the head,” he was able to exact not
only fealty but also generous financial, material, and sexual favors
from his followers.
Also of concern to the prosecution were issues of religion and national identity. Rosa’s “theft” of Catholicism was noted in Inspector
Tavares’ introduction to the case file.65 The prosecution accused him
of performing illegitimate baptisms and marriages and of misusing
Catholic saints in an African possession religion, taking control of the
look of the saints but then insidiously transforming them from within.
Tavares wrote in the opening pages of the case file, “The audacity and
perversity of these criminals goes to the point of involving our Holy
Religion in its infamous practices, succeeding in substituting it with
the most crude and abject superstition.”66 A few pages further on he
added, “Rosa dares to make use of the images and names of the saints
of the Catholic Church, in order to take advantage of even the religiosity of his victims, which he then transforms into the vilest superstition.”67
Not incidental in the depositions that appear in the case file was a
debate over what constitutes “Religion” at all. No comparative legal
definition existed of “Religion,” since in the colony—where the
Código Filipino and Catholic Inquisitorial law reigned supreme, such
that no bona fide “religion” existed outside of the Church, as described
above— none had been required. Nevertheless, a civil notion of religion was being worked out in the legal process, in the interstices. For
example, the defense lawyer Fillipe Jansen de Castro Albuquerque
Junior argued for Rosa’s innocence based on what he called a specious
64. Id.
65. Id. at 14b.
66. Id. at 12b (“A audacia e perversidade d’estes crimiosos chega ao ponto de involver
a nossa Santa Religião em suas practices infames, consequindo substituila pela mais grosseira
e abjecta superstição.”).
67. Id. at 14b (“Rosa atreve-se a servir-se de imagens e do nome de Santos da Igreja
Catholica, afim de aproveitar-se até da religiosidade de suas victimas…religiosidade que elle
transfrma na mais grosseira e vil superstição.”)..
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and shifting opposition between “sorcery” vs. “religion.”68 He wrote,
“This fame, this power, these wonders, when tolerated and not suppressed by the police, repeated over many years, will elevate these
‘sorceries’ to a ‘belief’ or ‘religion.’”69 One period’s sorcery may be a
succeeding generation’s religion, he claimed. Albuquerque Junior
made additional subtle arguments. He proposed, for example, that the
investigation and prosecution had applied terms to Juca Rosa that technically enjoyed no standing in a court of law—”sorcery,” “fetishism,”
“deflowering.”70 They should, he argued, be acknowledged as anachronistic survivals of the Phillipine Code71 still alive but breathing its
last gasps. Argued Albuquerque Junior, these terms could not serve as
legitimate categories of empirical investigation, thus their presence
had no purpose but to bamboozle: to sway public opinion, enflame
sentiments, and otherwise infiltrate proper judicial reasoning with the
terms of medieval witch hunts. In short, the defense lawyer tried to
marshal and quicken the judge’s “modern” ambitions and, more
broadly, the national fears of being left behind in the evolution of nations.
Given the extremely public quality of the trial, that its every subtext was reported in newspapers nationwide, the relentless drumbeat of
the feitiçeiro accusation likely influenced Rosa’s eventual conviction.
Into that one loaded word a series of notions was packed: of Africanness, black magic, dissimulation, promiscuous sexuality, and more.
It may seem surprising that at least a half-century after a new legal
regime (the 1830 Penal Code) had officially replaced the Phillipine
Code, such terms nevertheless remained. We can call this “judicial
lag,” the interstitial or overlapping period between two legal regimes.72
68. Id. at 140b.
69. Id..
70. See generally id.at 15.
71. The Ordenações Filipinas derived 1603, from the time of King Phillip who ruled
Spain in the period when Spain and Portugal were a joined kingdom (1580–1640). The Code
can be accessed at http://www1.ci.uc.pt/ihti/proj/filipinas/ordenacoes.htm (last consulted
March 10, 2016).
72. A new Civil Code was mandated when Brazil became independent from Portugal in
1822, and the 1824 Constitution ordered new Civil and Criminal Codes, specifying that the
Ordenações Filipinas should continue in effect until the new codes were completed and implemented. While a new Criminal Code became effective in 1831, and a new Commercial
Code was effected in 1854, a new Civil Code was not completed until 1916; thus the Philippines Code remained in play, at least technically, well into the 20th century. Teixeira de Freitas,
President of the Institute of Brazilian Lawyers and counsel for the Secretary of State (Conselho
de Estado) was contracted by the government in 1855 to draft the new code, but by 1867 he
desisted, citing incompatibilities with the government. See GRINBERG, supra note 42 at 10.
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The terms and categories from 1603 yet remained in the interstices,
embedded in all the discourse that takes part in constituting, and influencing the outcome of, a trial.
No legal process could determine the authenticity of Rosa’s possessions, or his intent—how could one determine whether he was possessed by spirits, or whether he authentically believed himself so inspired. Still, his conviction derived in part from being persuasively
presented as a feitiçeiro, in colorful 17th century terms.73 Though the
defense lawyer assiduously reminded the court that fetishism and sorcery were no longer valid crimes, the very need for those repeated reminders only indicate how powerful those words still were. The African spirits, and the 17th century representations of them, haunted the
legal record of the early 1870s.
By virtue of their ritually superadded agencies, the spirits of foreign sovereigns that occupied their bodies, Afro-Brazilian practices
were judged to not be viable citizens’ religions, as religions able to be
assimilated to Catholicism, the only legal religion through 1891. This
was for predictable reasons of national identity being entangled with
religious tradition, but also because of the growing power of the medical establishment that consolidated its authority by marginalizing folk
healers, divination techniques, and Afro-Brazilian material practices
(curandeiras, sortilegios, feitiçaria) under the antiquated rubrics.74 To
wit, even two decades after the trial, the influential doctor and criminologist, Raimundo Nina Rodrigues described the Afro-Brazilian tradition of Candomblé as a risk to the budding republic: Its West African
deities comprised a form of foreign government, he posited, and those
who practice Yoruba religion thus practice a rival political system.75
Rodrigues declared that he had even heard of possession’s power in
motivating battle and sedition—a good reason, he wrote, to prohibit
African immigration.76 The religion problematically involves possession, the loss of individual personality, memory, and accountability.77
Finally, he argued, Candomblé has already taken possession of the
73. See e.g., Book V, Code III from 1603 expressly prohibits acts of calling powers of
the devil—(“invocar spiritos diabolicos”). The Code can be accessed at
http://www1.ci.uc.pt/ihti/proj/filipinas/ordenacoes.htm (last consulted March 10, 2016).
74. MAGGIE, supra note 19..
75. Raimundo Nina Rodrigues, O ANIMISMO FETICHISTA DOS NEGROS BAHIANOS 112
(1935).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 99, 116–17.
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country; it has penetrated “no ânimo publico,” into the public spirit,
and risks further expansion via contagion. He drove this home dramatically with a description of a possessed white girl,78 a rhetorical move
calculated to demonstrate the spread of Afro-Brazilian practices across
all social sectors, and the risks to personhood—and thus to the nation- they posed.
Photographic evidence and “intent”
Juca Rosa evoked fear and invited interpretation for many of the
reasons named by Nina Rodrigues. Emerging national, medical, and
criminological regimes—and often all three at once—availed themselves of the new technology of photography to assess the inner lives
of citizens/ patients/ perpetrators.79 In the same year that the French
police were gathering photographs of all who had participated in the
Paris Commune in order to catalogue all dissidents,80 Brazilian authorities were anxiously examining a photo of Juca Rosa for dangerous
signs. His case was thoroughly affected by the new technology of photography, as we will see.

78. Id. 123–6. For the case of Cuba, compare FERNANDO ORTIZ, HAMPA AFRO-CUBANA:
LOS NEGROS ESCLAVOS 17 (1916), who does the same.
79. See generally Susan Sontag, ON PHOTOGRAPHY (1977). On the co-making of Anthropology and photography, see ANTHROPOLOGY AND PHOTOGRAPHY (Elizabeth Edwards, ed.
1992); Jens Andermann, Espetáculos da diferença: a Exposição Antropológica Brasileira de
1882, TOPOI - REVISTA DE HISTÓRIA 128–70 (2004); PATRICIA LAVELLE, O ESPELHO
DISTORCIDO: IMAGENS DO INDIVIDUO NO BRASIL OITOCENTISTA (Belo Horizonte: UFMG,
2003), Georges Didi-Huberman, Invention de l’hystérie: Charcot et l’iconographie photographique de la Salpêtrière (1982). Lilia Moritz Schwarcz, “Além do enquadramento: Em
Paris ou no Rio de Janeiro, fotos de presos revelam muito mais do que a identificação de
‘vagabundos,’” Revista de história.com.br, 2011.
80. Sontag, On Photography, 7. The French photographer Disdéri systematically took
portraits of the dead in their coffins.
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Rosa’s case was unusual because of the large role played by one
small photograph. His case file still includes the image.
Figure 1

[Photo taken by Author. Processo José Sebastião de Rosa, Arquivo
Nacional, Corte de Apelação (Court of Appeals), Rio de Janeiro. Maço
(Bundle) 196, caixa (Box) 11139, número 1081, galeria C, at 22
(1871].
The photo was discovered by the police in the home of one of
his followers and was employed in the process of acquiring depositions. Investigators presented the photograph to all witnesses, wielding
it as a prompt for testimony.81
The photograph’s material form was that of the carte de visite,
a type of small portrait produced in sets of eight per photo plate and
popularized in the late 1860s for cheap and easy distribution.82 The
portrait depicts Juca Rosa and a companion standing on a proscenium
painted with flowers and set against a bare white background. The

81. Inspector Ignacio Ronaldo recorded his discovery of the photograph and his use of it
in acquiring testimonies. Processo Jos. . . Sebastião de Rosa, supra note 52 at12, 27.
82. Jaguaribe, Beatriz and Maurício Lissovsky. 2009. The Visible and the Invisibles:
Photography and Social Imaginaries in Brazil. Public Culture 21/1: 175–209.
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open space is filled by a ritual situation or, more likely, a ritual simulation. A follower named João Maria da Conceição kneels before Rosa
and points toward him with a staff.83
Despite the action conveyed and the import accorded to it by
the police investigation, the photograph is silent in its fact-making. We
know from depositions only that Juca’s clients possessed his photograph, and that Rosa also kept photos of them.84 The uses of the photographs remain blurred, though some depositions hint that holding
images of persons may have served as a means of ritually controlling
them.85 Leopoldina Fernandes Cabral told Tavares that even when she
wanted to break free from Rosa’s influence, she could not because he
had threatened her, “telling her that if she does (leave), he, with the
spirit that he ruled for good as for harm, would disgrace her and make
her end up in at Mercy Hospital.”86
Matjis Van de Port gives a plausible explanation from another
sector of 19th century Brazilian religion: “The ‘photographic real’ was
picked up in religious-magical practices, where it came to substitute
the body.”87 Photographs were used, he notes, in place of wooden body
parts as ex-votos left in churches testifying the occurrence of a miraculous healing, and even as proxies of deceased children.88 Rosa may
have used carte de visite photographs of his devotees following this
logic, as proxies for their bodies, just as many Afro-Atlantic ritual
practices, as well as other traditions, employ photographs in our own
time. By ritually acting on the photograph for harm or benefit, the person is affected as well, and indeed, several statements given by witnesses indicate that Rosa declared as much.89 Juca Rosa’s photograph
may also have served as a bodily proxy of his presence for his followers. Here the photographic real assumes another meaning, however,
whereby the photograph extends a priest’s presence and power into
clients’ homes and bodies to, by virtue of the “photographic real,” exert religious authority over them.

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Processo José Sebastião de Rosa, supra note 52 at 35.
Id. at 104, 133.
Id. at 20, 86b.
SAMPAIO supra note 50 at 99.
MATTIJIS VAN DE PORT, ECSTATIC ENCOUNTERS: BAHIAN CANDOMBLÉ
QUEST FOR THE REALLY REAL 87 (2011)..
88. Id. at 85.
89. Processo José Sebastião de Rosa, supra note 52 at 86b.
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The same photograph held a quite different meaning for the police, serving as testament to the performance of illegitimate ritual and
illegal practices. It froze Rosa in time, donned in the vestments of possession. That image was key to the investigation’s inquiry into how he
was transformed from rational individual into a person possessed.90
For, at least according to the depositions, Juca Rosa was typically possessed when wearing the garments that he chose to depict in the photograph.91 For the police investigation and then in the trial, the photo
served as visual evidence of Rosa’s priestly performance, and perhaps
it worked similarly on his ritual community, such that seeing his portrait in the garb of possession helped them to recall and re-experience
Rosa’s authoritative presence. For participants in the ritual group, the
photograph helped to produce new modes of sociality, ritual practice,
and even new modes of “religious experience”: the presence of a priest
now rendered present via photographic proxy. From the side of the investigation, the photo presented visual evidence, etched in black and
white, that he ritually called and engaged African spirits on behalf of
clients who he helped, and from whom he also illegally profited.
Photographs also radically transformed the legal process in relation to religion and the freedom of religious practice. As nation-states
took up the project of documenting their citizenries’ characteristics at
the end of the 19th century, including religious ones, the photograph’s
material form neatly fit the procedures of state bureaucracies and “police work” as those systems came into being.92 The flat shape and flexible paper construction of Juca Rosa’s carte de visite photograph made
it a congenial fit for the hand, convenient for interrogations in the short
term, and amenable to flat rectangular shape of the legal file in the long
term. This quality of the image-thing’s material “fit” in the court file
is what allows me access to the photograph still today, granting it an
ongoing power of signification. But what, exactly, did it signify?
Judge Tavares was able to deduce the following from the witnesses: At a specific moment in ritual gatherings in the home of one of
his devotees (Henriqueta Maria de Mello), Rosa would retreat to a separate chamber in the company of a woman named Ereciana in order to

90. Id. at 104.
91. Id.
92. Holloway, supra note 46.
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change to his special attire of blue corduroy and silver fringe—the accoutrement that appears in the photograph.93 Upon reemerging, he was
transformed into a powerful authority named Father (Pai) Quibombo.
He would then fall to the floor and be “taken” (tomado) by a range of
additional spirits—among them “Santo Zuza” and “Pai Vencedor.”94
Rosa never confessed to such possession states, nor to the influence they may have exerted over his mostly female devotees, nor
the sexual possibilities he was accused of exploiting by virtue of his
religious status.95 While undergoing his second interrogation, he was
asked about the special garments, but Rosa denied any kind of ritual
use at all. He claimed the clothes were a Carnaval costume (“mandou
fazer essas vestimentas e as possuía para usar pelo Carnaval”).96 And
when asked to justify his possession of the photographs of many of his
followers, he insisted it was just for play or a joke (chalaça).97 And so
inspectors and prosecutors used Juca Rosa’s portrait to try to discern
the look of possession—evidence of one who works with a “saint in
the head.”98 They easily found all the requisite parts of the accusatory
narrative, conveniently and graphically presented for the prosecution:
“African” garments (even a “feitiço” sack hanging from his belt);
“primitive acts” (indexed by his bare feet); the tools for a drumming
ceremony; and unwarranted social hierarchy, implying the power Juca
Rosa exerted over followers. The photograph was as crucial to Juca
Rosa’s conviction as it was to his fame. The case suggests how AfroBrazilian spirit possession evoked fears related to religion, legal personhood, citizenship, and national identity. Juca Rosa in particular
seems to have focused fears of social contagion, the fear that even
white elites could be permeable to African and Afro-Brazilian spirits,
as indeed they were, and are today.
Not all possession religions, however, inspired the same fears,
or hearkened back to 17th century terms of diabolical “sorcery.” Not
all spirit possession traditions of Brazil were treated with the same ju-

93. Processo José Sebastião de Rosa, supra note 52 at 16b.
94. SAMPAIO, supra note 50, at 186.
95. Processo José Sebastião de Rosa, supra note 52 at 17b.
96. Mandou fazer essas vestimentas e as possuía para usar pelo Carnaval, In Gabriela dos
Reis SAMPAIO. Nas Trincheiras da Cura. As diferentes medicinas no Rio de Janeiro Imperial
128 (2001)
97. Id.
98. Processo José Sebastião de Rosa, supra note 52 at 104.
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dicial lag. In fact, the legal treatment of possession or mediumistic religions split in early 20th century Brazil. Euro-Brazilian Spiritism and
its spirit possessions acquired a protected legal status and legitimacy
as “religion” long before Afro-Brazilian rites did. To explore the differences, I now turn to another type of spirit possession case in Brazil.
FRANCISCO XAVIER AND THE 21ST CENTURY POSSESSED
Humberto de Campos case
This highly publicized case from 1944 reveals how, by problematizing the issue of authorship, legal definitions of personhood and
“the individual” were refined and illuminated in relation to spirits and
the question of mortality or bodily death.
Humberto de Campos died in December 1934. Though he died
young, as the best-known Brazilian author of his day, he already occupied seat number 20 in the Academy of the Immortals, the pantheon of
literary greats modeled after Paris. Humberto de Campos proved immortal in more than one way. In March 1935, just three months after
his death, he began to speak to a boy in the state of Minas Gerais, Francisco (“Chico”) Xavier.99 In this section I rely on the detailed case
summary published by Miguel Timponi (1959), as well as journalistic
accounts and my own reading of the materials.100
Xavier recalled hearing the spirit’s words, “Prepare yourself,
boy, we have lots to do tonight.”101 After finishing work at his day-job
in Belo Horizonte, he devoted several hours nightly to writing down
Humberto de Campos’ words, in a state of trance.102 To describe the
process of spirit-writing (psicografia) he said: “It is as though someone
applied an electrical device to my right elbow with its own automatic
will. It’s not me who writes. I obey a superior force.”103
By 1944 Xavier had published five books authored “by” the
famous deceased writer, Humberto de Campos.104 In that year, though,
99. Interview with Chico Xavier. Celestino Silveira, O espirito de Emanuel, REVISTA DA
SEMANA, 29 1944 (July 22).
100. MIGUEL TIMPONI, PSICOGRAFIA ANTE OS TRIBUNAIS (1959).
101. SILVEIRA, supra note 99.
102. Id.
103. Id. “como si aplicassem no meu cotovelo direito um aparêlho electric com dispositivo
automatic. Não sou eu quem escreve. Obedeço à força superior.”
104. Here are the titles: Crônicas de além-túmulo; Brasil, coração do mundo, pátria do
evangelho; Novas mensagens; Boa nova; Reportagens de além-túmulo. Roughly translated,
the titles are “Chronicles from Beyond the Grave”; “Brazil, Heart of the World, Fatherland of
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Humberto’s widow and three children filed suit against Xavier and the
Spiritist Federation of Brazil (FEB).105 The trial filled headlines as the
“Humberto de Campos Case.” The family asked the court to render a
definitive decision as to whether the works were or were not drafted
by the spirit of their deceased husband or father.106 They accused Chico
Xavier of selling his own books by exploiting the fame of Humberto
de Campos.107 Moreover, they argued, such books confused the reading public and competed for sales with the books he actually wrote
while still alive. The books mediated by Chico Xavier were inferior,
the suit continued, and when not inferior then simply plagiarized.108
Finally, Humberto de Campos’ family insisted that if their father or
husband were determined by the court to be actually still writing, as a
spirit, in that case the royalties for any books sold must be paid to the
family.109 On the other hand, if the books were judged to not be authored by the spirit of Humberto, they requested that all copies be removed from circulation, and that the medium Chico Xavier be prosecuted for fraud.110
While the family accused Xavier of plagiarism, the Brazilian
Spiritist Federation (FEB), which had published Xavier’s books and
was therefore part of the defense, tried to show that the books by postmortem and pre-mortem Humbertos were indistinguishable in style.
They entitled their defense document, widely circulated to the public,
“Two Humbertos: One Style, One Soul, One Feeling” (“Os dois Humbertos: um só estilo, uma só alma, um só sentimento.”111 Most importantly, they claimed that the courts hold no jurisdiction in adjudicating the question, since the asserted presence and voice of a postmortem spirit is a matter of freedom of religion and thus constitutionally protected.112
The family’s lawsuit demanded that all parties appear in person: Not only Chico Xavier but also the spirit of Humberto de Campos,
the Good News”; “New Messages”; “Good News”; “Reports from Beyond the Grave.”
105. The suit was filed by the widow of Humberto de Campos and family was filed in
Civil Court against Francisco Cândido Xavier (Chico Xavier) and his publisher, Federação
Espirita Brasileira, in 1944. The case was heard by Judge João Frederico Mourão Russell of
Federal District 8.
106. TIMPONI, supra note 100, at 14.
107. Id. at 11.
108. Id. at 220.
109. Id. at 32.
110. Id. at 34, 44. 85, 103.
111. Id. at 177–205.
112. Id. at 17–20.
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whose “operationality” should be demonstrated and verified.113 On
August 23, 1944, though, Judge João Frederico Mourão Russell declared the suit invalid, arguing that, 1) upon death the individual forfeits his/her civil rights, such that the entity “Humberto de Campos”
no longer carried legal standing and 2) inherited authorial rights were
limited to works an author produced prior to death.114 Finally, he noted
that, 3) the judicial system is only empowered to pronounce on entities
already existing within a judicial relationship; it is ill-equipped to decide whether or not the entities of such a relation empirically “exist”
in the first place.115 The family appealed but to no avail, and the decision was reaffirmed in November 1944.116 In the wake of the trial,
Chico Xavier went on to publish another seven books under the authorship of Humberto de Campos, until 1967. Humberto was now
named “Brother X” on the book-covers in order to avoid further legal
entanglements with the deceased author’s family, but Brother X was
known by all to serve as a code-name for Humberto de Campos.117
Noteworthy from this case was how, by problematizing authorship, the legal definition of the individual was called into play and clarified. The court made clear that at least in terms of civil rights, individual identity ceases to exist with bodily death.
José Divino Nunes case
Spirits entered the legal process through the agency of Chico
Xavier on several further occasions. Among them was the first time in
Brazilian law that a spirit’s testimony was admitted as legal defense.
On Saturday morning, May 8, 1976, in the Brazilian city of
Goiânia, a 16-year-old boy named José Divino Nunes killed Maurício
Henrique.118 Maurício found the gun in José’s father’s bag.119 A few
moments later he was dead. Two years later, while in a spirit-writing

113. Id. at 21.
114. Id. at 40.
115. Id. at 29, 30.
116. Id. at 255.
117. See the website of the Federação Espirita Brasileira (FEB), where the books by
“Brother X” alias Humberto de Campos are still sold. http://www.febeditora.com.br/autores/humberto-de-campos-irmao-x/ (last accessed March 12, 2016).
118. The case details are recounted in NEMER DA SILVA AHMAD, PSICOGRAFIA: O NOVO
OLHAR DA JUSTIÇA (2008).
119. Id.
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trance, Chico Xavier drafted a letter from the deceased victim to his
family.120 The message said:
Dear Mother, Father and Sisters. I came here today asking for your courage. I ask you not to think of my trip
here with sadness. Neither José Divino nor anyone was
to blame for what happened. We were playing with the
revolver thinking that with a loaded gun you could
wound someone by aiming at his image in a mirror. I
was wounded as a result of this foolish game, and the
rest we all know.121
Judge Orimar Bastos of the 6th district court verified that the
spirit’s signature was identical to that of the deceased teenager.122 The
defense reminded the court that, under the modern penal code, it is “the
motives…that are the touchstone of crime. There is no crime without
intent; it is only there that a crime exists” (Citing Article 121 of the
Penal Code).123 Based on a judgment of motive and the lack of intent
as conveyed by a spirit witness—that is, the spirit of the victim--the
judge pronounced Nunes innocent.124 The legal foundation he named
was the lack of any apparent intent or premeditation in the homicide,
but he added in his written statement,
We must give credibility to the spiritual message even
though it is unprecedented in judicial circles, that the
victim himself, after his death, comes to relate and furnish facts . . . that correspond with the declaration of
José Divino himself . . . . This frees the accused of
guilt.
He added,
Mauricio’s message not only enlightened me, but also
backed up all of the defense’s testimony…The message
had to be mentioned in the ruling because it helped me
120. Id.; see also Judge Orimar de Bastos’ own story of the case and its aftermath: ORIMAR
(2010); and the story from the perspective of the deceased, as mediated by Chico Xavier, in SPIRIT OF MAURÍCIO GARCEZ HENRIQUE
THROUGH FRANCISCO CÂNDIDO XAVIER, LEALDADE (1982)
121. SANDRA JACQUELINE STOLL, ESPIRITISMO À BRASILEIRA 125 (2003).
122. Id.
123. “Os motivos determinados constituem, no direito penal moderno, a pedra de toque
do crime. Não há crime gratuito ou sem motivo, e é no motivo que reside à significação mesma
do crime”.
124. ORIMAR DE BASTOS, supra note 120..
DE BASTOS, O JUSTO JUIZ: HISTÓRIA DE UMA SENTENCE
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make my decision...I am not a spiritualist. I judged
Nunes innocent because the killing was not premeditated. Mauricio’s message said the killing was a foolish
mistake, no one was to blame. The decision was easy
for me.125
We should add that by this time Xavier, who had mediated the
spirit’s testimony, was a national celebrity. Indeed, Chico Xavier’s authenticity as a legitimate medium was supported during the trial by a
public statement read by a representative of the Public Prosecutors’
Office of the state of Goias.126 It was the first time in Brazilian history
that a spirit had helped a judge to decide a case, though it wouldn’t be
the last. Additional cases involving spirit-testimony were tried in 1984
and 2006.127
Spirit-testimonies as legal technique
In more recent decades, certain prosecuting attorneys have begun
seeking out “spirit testimonies” as an effective and persuasive way to
reach juries. The 2006 case spurred public debate on the future of Brazil’s judiciary, and the specter of widespread reliance, or even solicitation of, spirit testimony. I take the liberty of translating and excerpting the story as it appeared in Brazil’s most respected news daily,
Folha de São Paulo, on May 30, 2006:
Two spirit-writing letters were used in the defense’s argument for the case in which Iara Marques
Barcelos, 63, was acquitted of homicide, by a [jury]
vote of five to two. The letters were attributed to the
authorship of murder victim…The defense lawyer,
Lúcio de Constantino, read the documents in court last
Friday, seeking to absolve his client of the accusation
that he had ordered the killing of the notary public, Ercy
da Silva Cardosa. Though it has caused controversy in
the judiciary, spirit-written letters have already been accepted in judgments…
125. Id.
126. Xavier appeared at and was honored by the Goiâs State Legislature on May 7, 1974.
[Cite to statement or some documentation of event.]
127. [Cases or reports of testimonies should be cited to.] The deceased wrote again (on
May 12, 1980), this time to his mother (presented to the father on television, Programa Flávio
Cavalcanti): “Ask Father to accept the version that I gave of this event (that my physical body
had suppressed). Don’t look for a guilty party. Everything ended in peace, because the accident
really was an accident, and father must reflect on this, based on my own words.” See XAVIER,
LEALDADE, supra note 120. Chico Xavier died in 2002.
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The lawyer’s reading of the letter was heard
with careful attention by the seven jury-members. He
read, “What most weighs on my heart is to see Iara accused like this, by dissimulators and fakers who are just
like those who killed me…I send Iara a fraternal embrace from me, Ercy.”
The notary public was 71 at the time of his
death. He died in his home in July 2003, as a result of
two gunshots to the head. Iara Barcelos was accused
when Ercy da Silva’s 29 year-old housekeeper, Leandro
Rocha Almeida, stated that he had been contracted by
Iara Barcelos to scare her patron, with whom she also
maintained an affective relation…Almeida was condemned to 15 1/2 years of prison, though he denied having committed or ordered the crime.
The letters from the victim were spirit-written
[psicografada] by the medium, Jorge José Santa Maria.
One of the letters was addressed to the husband of the
accused, who was also a friend of the victim. The other
letter was addressed to the defendant herself. The accused’s husband initially sought help regarding the case
at a spiritist meeting.
The defense lawyer claims to have studied spiritist theory in order to prepare the defense, though he
himself claims no religious affiliation. He cited the letters as the breaking point in the decision, playing a key
role in his client’s aquittal. Folha de São Paulo was unable to speak with the medium. Because jurors are not
asked to comment on the rationale for their votes, it is
difficult to evaluate the influence of the spirit letters.
The documents were accepted in court because they
were presented within the proper time frame, and because the prosecutor did not attempt to prevent or impugn their status…(trans. mine)128
Striking in this case was the fact that the defense lawyer admitted to using spiritism and spirit-testimony as a defense ploy and emphasized how well it had worked. This move motivated substantial

128. http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/folha/cotidiano/ult95u122179.shtml,
July 28, 2014.

consulted

on
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concern. Folha de São Paulo ran a story on May 19, 2008, under the
banner, “Association Wants to Spiritualize the Judiciary.” The report
addressed the “polemic” surrounding the multiple and increasingly
forceful associations of spiritist judges and lawyers. The largest of
these is called the Brazilian Association of Spiritist Magistrates (Associação Brasileira de Magistrados Espíritas) and numbers over 700
judges of the court.129 Among them is Francisco Cesar Asfor Rocha,
who sat on Brazil’s Supreme Court from 1992–2012. A newer organization comprised of police deputies, prosecutors, lawyers, and judges
was recently founded in São Paulo, called the Association JuridicalSpiritist, and counts several hundred members.130 The association advocates for a judiciary that is “more responsive to humanitarian questions,” and able to engage polemical issues like abortion, euthanasia,
gay marriage, the death penalty, and stem-cell research.131 They state,
“God is the greatest law,” and defend the use of spirit-written letters in
court.132 One of the Association’s founders, the prosecutor Tiago Essado declared, “The State is secular (laico), but people are not. There
is no way to dissociate enough to say: I’ll only use my faith only in the
spiritist center.”133 Meanwhile the president of the Brazilian Association of Spiritist Magistrates, retired federal judge Zalmino Zimmerman, stated that the Association’s objective is “the spiritualization and
humanization of law and the judiciary.”134
When the Ministry of Justice (Conselho Judiciario Nacional)
was asked to address the question of spirit-testimony and the apparent
growing power of spiritist-judiciary associations, the judge and
spokesman Alexandre Azevedo dismissed the concern, “I don’t see
any difference between a declaration given by me or you, and a declaration given by a medium, spirit-written (psicografada) by someone.”135 By at least some measures, then, spirit-writing as testimony is
being normalized as a part of the legal process in Brazil.136 Spiritists
129. From the organization’s own website, available at: abrame.org.br (last accessed on
March 12, 2016)
130. See their website: http://www.ajesaopaulo.com.br/ (last accessed on March 12, 2016)
131. FOLHA DE SÃO PAULO, May 19, 2008: “Associação quer espiritualizar o Judiciário,”
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/fsp/cotidian/ff1905200801.htm (last accessed March 12, 2016).
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. (“Não enxergaria nenhuma diferença entre uma declaração feita por mim ou por
você e uma declaração mediúnica, que foi psicografada por algu. . .m.”)
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/fsp/cotidian/ff1905200801.htm, consulted on July 28, 2014
136. I note here that the legal notion of a testimonial individual (a witness) is much less
narrowly circumscribed than the authorial individual. This is because legal defenses allow
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counter the claim that they are infusing religion into law by arguing
that Spiritism is not a religion so much as a science of knowing; an
epistemology, a way of seeing, a method of inquiry. For these judges
and lawyers, practicing Spiritism is much like practicing law.
DISCUSSION
Multi-person bodies and the traditions that cultivate them as
sources of special revelation pose special challenges for legal institutions and procedures. Because such religions and their manifold invisible agents are prevalent across most of the world, those challenges
should be addressed, and perhaps this essay will serve to open avenues
of comparative inquiry. To follow Annemarie Mol’s work on medicine
and the body multiple,137 this essay did not seek an epistemology of
law—how legal situations come to “know” personhood—but rather focused on legal enactment, the question of how personhood is shaped
into certain form through the procedures of specific cases. As in medicine, legal enactments are shot through with implicit normative judgments, not least with respect to the question of accountable and legally
liable, or forensic personhood. Spirits and possession straddle medical
and legal versions of the normative.138
The cases suggest a question that hopefully by now has been
made more uncanny than when I began: What, exactly, is a “legal person”? Phrased differently, what kind of personhood does law require?
The case studies from Brazil reviewed in this essay make it clear that
the legal person is subject to contest and legal debate. Juca Rosa’s possessed personhood, a shape-shifting personhood with “saint in the
head,” rendered him a transgressor and placed him outside of the law.
More recent cases involving spirit-testimonies, by contrast, have
placed possession or mediumistic states and their revelations at the
center of at least some legal decisions. All the cases involving possession, though, entail and allow a deferral or complicating of individual

greater latitude than do legal claims or accusations.
137. ANNEMARIE MOL, THE BODY MULTIPLE: ONTOLOGY IN MEDICAL PRACTICE vii
(2003).
138. Georges Canguilhem opened his classic work, The Normal and the Pathological,
“When we see in every sick man someone whose being has been augmented or diminished,
we are somewhat reassured, for what a man has lost can be restored to him, and what has
entered him can also leave. We can hope to conquer disease even if it is the result of a spell,
or magic, or possession…Disease enters and leaves man as through a door” (2007: 39).
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accountability.
One reason is that possessions may complicate the time sequence
usually required in legal reckonings of causality. For example, in one
of the cases, the appearance of a victim’s spirit in 1978-9 helped to
determine “what happened” in 1976. In another case, two letters written in 2006 from a man killed in 2003 secured the defendant’s innocence. In both instances, spirits acted on legal time and seriality,
achieving a temporal collapse by which a victim three-years in the
grave was enabled to speak forcefully into the judicial present.
While personhood ends with natural death, according to the Brazilian civil law verdict in the 1944 Humberto de Campos case, natural
death is not a self-evident or consistent boundary. Certain later cases
suggest the possibility of intelligent human agency persisting beyond
the body’s demise. In multiple homicide cases described above—in
1978, 1984, and 2006—deceased witnesses’ testimony was admitted
in court after being written down by a different, living human medium’s hand.
A second point: Spirit possessions may act on legal reckonings
of intent. At least, as we have seen, spirit-testimony is effective in influencing Brazilian juries’ understanding of intent. José Divino, for example, was shown by a spirit’s testimony to have not acted with intent,
and to therefore not be accountable for homicide. Brazilian and other
legal systems are replete with subtle adjustments based on putative intent: Religious commitments affect intent and can change legal status.139 Then too, crimes committed in a fit of violent rage after being
provoked, when one is “not oneself” can reduce a sentence dramatically; conversely, crimes committed with too much intent, “for egoistic
motives,” can receive particularly harsh sentences. Madness or insanity claims present legal extremes of non-intentional action and sentences are modified accordingly.140 Given all of these complications of
139. In Brazil’s 1891 Constitution, religiosos of any monastic community that required
vows of obedience were prohibited from voting (along with beggars, women, the illiterate,
and those under 21 years of age), because they “had renounced their liberty as Individuals.”
To pose the question in these terms, What did it mean to, through religious practice, “renounce
one’s liberty as an Individual?” We might argue that the individual being renounced was that
of the state-sanctioned and legal individual, but this only begs the further question of precisely
what constitutes such a being.
140. In Brazil’s 1890 Penal Code, offenders “under a state of total perturbation of the
senses and intelligence at the time of the crime were not criminally responsible.” “Honor
crimes” are regarded “temporary insanity.” The 1940 code introduced the phrase “semi-imputable” as a category of mental status, partial impairment of cognitive or volitive elements,
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intent and the measuring of defendants’ interior states they require,
spirit possession may be seen less as a full departure from other legal
calibrations of the internal person, than as an especially complex problem of how to gauge inner motivations, since possessed defendants
may refer to multiple agents acting in the same body.
Parenthetically, I would call attention here to the striking juxtaposition between, on one hand, the legal prestige of “intent” and the
kind of individuality such gauging of intent requires, and on the other
hand the religious prestige of non-intentionality--the spirits or the
Spirit acting on, or acting through a body understood as a vessel of
invisible and greater power, with ritual events made to dramatize that
difference in power. What happens when those two systems collide in
public space? In the North Atlantic tradition, people express dismay
when spirits appear in political or judicial space. Witness the news
made by then-vice presidential candidate Sarah Palin when a Kenyan
pastor exorcised her bad spirits.141 Note how the House of Representatives stenographer Dianne Reidy made news on October 16, 2013,
when she abruptly grabbed the microphone in Congress while in the
throes of the Holy Spirit.142 This kind of hyperagency, the excess of
persons in a given body in political or judicial space, seems dangerously illegible and underdetermined, at least based on the more recent
episodes of the use of spirit-testimony in criminal trials presented here,
and the wide latitude accorded to the legal actor of “testimonial individual.”
Brazil seems to reside on the edge of this North Atlantic tradition. There, spirit possession and mediumship are familiar, even comprising an inter-religious national repertoire. The legitimacy of spirit
possessions arrived through spiritism in the early 20th century, and that
legitimacy was only then retroactively applied to Afro-Brazilian traditions. As we have seen, spiritist possessions been long been granted
more legal space in which to act than Afro-Brazilian traditions. The
French Kardecist, racially white, and pseudo-scientific articulation of
and this feature was continued in the 1984 Code: Art 121 (“Codigo Penal § 1º Se o agente
comete o crime impelido por motivo de relevante valor social ou moral, ou sob o domínio de
violenta emoção, logo em seguida a injusta provocação da vítima, ou juiz pode reduzir a pena
de um sexto a um terço. Aumento de penaI—se o crime é praticado por motivo egoístico . . .”).
141. Laurie Goodstein, YouTube Videos Draw Attention to Palin’s Faith. NEW YORK
TIMES, October 25, 2008. http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/25/us/politics/25faith.html?_r=0
(last accessed March 12, 2016).
142. http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2013/10/house-stenographer-credits-holyspirit-for-her-rant-against-congress/ (last accessed on March 12, 2016).
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spirits found resonance among at least some members of the judiciary,
such that symbiotic juridical-spiritist associations could be forged. To
members of such associations, the “primitive” possessions of Juca
Rosa’s sort, involving transformations or extensions of personhood
like becoming Father Quibombo, or having one’s head “mounted” by
Yoruba orixás and Amerindian caboclos--these cannot appear in court
other than as targets of prosecution. They seem to obliterate the reckoning of individual intent whatsoever, undermining the kind of accountable individuality that law typically requires, and hails.
Finally, perhaps we can use the Brazilian case to think comparatively on the issue of “legal personhood.”143 Author Charles Taylor
famously argued that the western individual is characterized by the notion of the “buffered self,” a form of personhood that is impermeable
to possession by external agents and therefore, by virtue of its very
insularity, at least relatively identical over time.144 The temporal dimension of enduring accountability and recognizability is key to the
very notion of identity. Susanna Blumenthal described the “default legal person” in the U.S. as something much like Taylor’s buffered
self.145 Versions of a default legal person exist in every national legal
culture, and legal systems may even require a default legal person in
order to function at all. Lacking one, they apply techniques to create
one. One method of creating a default legal person is by contrasting
him (and it has mostly been a him), with the “weak spirits” that appear
in, say, the descriptions of Juca Rosa’s initiates, or in Kant’s discussions of Swedenborg.146 In the writings of figures like Hobbes, Locke,

143. Other forms of a legal “excess of persons” are becoming routine. Take the idea of the
juridical person as distinct from the natural person. This doctrine, by which corporations act
as legal persons descends from the words of Pope Innocent IV in the 13th century, with his
simple phrase, “since the College is in corporate matters figured as a person.” By this he underscored that a given community within the Church could be collectively represented by a
single natural person; and, moreover, that this personness exists beyond any natural person, as
persona ficta. It was a spiritual, not material reality. In other words we can read a religious,
uncanny quality back into the early legal formulation of “incorporation” (Otto von Gierke
1868) and corporate personhood. It seems uncanny precisely because of how it contrasts an
excess of persons with intuitive and inherited ideas of natural personhood. Perhaps our discomfiture with the recent Supreme Court decision in the U.S. on the corporate “personhood”
of anonymous collections of political donors, in that vein, is not altogether different than our
surprise at hearing of spirits acting through Chico Xavier in the Brazilian judiciary. Both require a leap of faith from natural bodies to personae ficta, the figure/fact/fantasy of many persons acting in one body. The leap may evoke horror, or wonder, or both.
144. CHARLES TAYLOR, A SECULAR AGE 27 (2007).
145. Susanna L. Blumenthal, The default legal person, UCLA LAW REVIEW 54 (2007).
146. See supra note 1.
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Kant, and Hume, for example, the accountable individual person acquired its silhouette over and against another type, namely the very
permeable person—like Juca Rosa and his women, to wit--who anthropologists later tried to interpret through their various prisms.147
Very permeable persons described by anthropologists must be
made or translated into legal persons if and when they enter states’
purviews. Some argue that legal culture even requires this submission,
a disfiguring. As Judith Butler wrote, “To be dominated by a power
external to oneself is a familiar and agonizing form power takes. To
find, however, that what ‘one’ is, one’s very formation as a subject, is
in some sense dependent on that very power is quite another.”148 Butler’s line has been too often and too casually cited, but what intrigues
me is how it, like Taylor’s descriptions of the buffered self or Blumenthal’s default legal person, plays frictionally over and against the figure
of the possessed. In Butler’s formulation, becoming a political subject
is every bit as much of a possession (and dispossession) as discovering
a god in one’s body.149 Author Colin Dayan names the quest for the
legal individual an “idiom of servility”: “state-sanctioned degradation
in America is propelled by a focus on personal identity, the terms by
which personality is recognized, threatened, or removed. I treat the legal history of dispossession as a continuum along which bodies and
spirits are remade over time.”150 Dayan seeks leverage by assessing
how the spirit of law and laws about spirits were intertwined.151
I agree with this critique in principle, yet it strikes me as too easy:
It is all well and good to posthumously support the spirit-possessions
of subalterns like Juca Rosa and his circle of followers. But what shall
147. Here is Marriot’s inaugural formulation of the ‘dividual’: “[S]ingle actors are not
thought in South Asia to be ‘individual’, that is, indivisible, bounded units, as they are in much
of Western social and psychological theory, as well as in common sense. Instead, it appears
that persons are generally thought by South Asians to be ‘dividual’ or divisible. To exist, dividual persons absorb heterogeneous material influences . . . .” MCKIM MARRIOTT,
HINDU TRANSACTIONS: DIVERSITY WITHOUT DUALISM 109 (1976).
148. JUDITH BUTLER, THE PSYCHIC LIFE OF POWER: THEORIES IN SUBJECTION 1–2 (1997).
149. She clarifies the power of law over subjecthood in the recent co-authored work, Dispossession: “[W]hen a woman is raped goes before the law in order to have the crime against
her prosecuted, she has to comply with the very idea of the reliable narrator and legitimate
subject inscribed in the law. As a result, if the law finds that she is not a legitimate subject,
that what she claims has no value, and that her speech in general is without value, then she is
actually deconstituted as a subject by the law in question.” JUDITH BUTLER & ATHENA
ATHANASIOU DISPOSSESSION: THE PERFORMATIVE IN THE POLITICAL 77 (2013).
150. COLIN DAYAN, THE LAW IS A WHITE DOG: HOW LEGAL RITUALS MAKE AND UNMAKE
PERSONS xiii (2013).
151. Id.
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we do with spirits when wielded by the wealthy and powerful, as in the
Brazilian associations of spiritist judges? How did this legally legitimate form of spirit possession come to be? If Juca Rosa and his marginalized followers seem to warrant our defense, these present-day
spiritist judges deserve our critique, or at least our attention and concern.
A lumpy history of legal personhood and spirits
In the period dividing Juca Rosa from Chico Xavier, the last third
of the 19th century and the first half of the 20th, the default legal person
was remade in the terms of a bio-person. Between 1850-1900 identities
began to be verified in photographs, fingerprints, and anthropometric
signs, acquired in techniques pioneered by criminologists like Bertillon in France and Galton in England.152 But this did not mean that other
kinds of persons abruptly ceased to exist. Multi-personated bodies continued to act and continue today in the religions of Candomblé, Vodou,
Santería, and many others, with “saint in the head.” They work on everyday crises of love, health, fertility, and financial success. Spiritism,
by contrast, adapted itself to the terms and procedures of the bio-person, applying photography, stenography, and medical sciences to their
authorizing procedures, and building elaborate bureaucracies (like legal associations) that neatly matched the rationalizing institutions that
characterized the early 20th century. They postured themselves as not
even members of something as lowly and partial as a “religion”; rather,
they spoke in terms of science. They rejected the primitive term, “possession,” and embraced the techno-term of “mediation.”153
CONCLUSION
Mediating messages from the dead in spirit-writing is no less uncanny than dancing an African god into presence. For reasons of racial
and social advantage, only the Spiritists of Brazil were able to successfully mimic the legal process, to symbiotically merge with it, and even
in certain instances, to infiltrate it, possess it, make it their own.

152. Giorgio Agamben, Identity without the person, in NUDITITES 46–54 (2011).
153. The distinction between the two appears already in Kardec’s Book of Mediums, published in 1861. In chapter 13 Kardec specified degrees of “obsession.” The altering of personality, or spirit possession, is classified as “obsession”; it is negative and can lead, argued Kardec, even to criminal behavior. ALLAN KARDEC, LE LIVRE DES MÉDIUMS (1861). On the
technophilia of spiritism as a science and a mechanics rather than a religion, see JEREMY
STOLOW, ED. DEUS IN MACHINA: RELIGION, TECHNOLOGY, AND THE THINGS IN BETWEEN
(2013)..
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In the history of European encounters with peoples of Africa and
the Americas, spirit-possessed action came to be viewed as the opposite of individual action—accountable, contract-worthy, transparent
and properly civil action—in early modern social theories that became
the template for political states in the Americas. Here I have focused
on Brazil to show how the figure of “the possessed” helped define the
proper sort of individual in relation to which civil participation in
emergent states was imagined, and the kind of legal personhood it
would require, and cultivate. In Brazil these especially came to the fore
between 1870 and 1950—between the lead-up to Abolition and the
mid-20th century legitimacy of certain (spiritist) forms of mediumship.
Proper state citizenship was imagined to require free, autonomous,
rational individuals with durable identities; only these could become
legal persons capable of making, guaranteeing and fulfilling trustworthy contracts—or being accountable or liable for failing to do so—that
nation-states founded on occidental values of liberalism and private
property seemed to require. Certain forms of religion enabled and fortified the proper individualism, and these were protected by the state,
while others threatened to undermine it. These were classified as fetishism, sorcery or, later, fraud. African and Afro-Brazilian practices in
particular appeared to generate non-rational states of possession that
could be socially and politically dangerous. At best they might be productive of permeable and multiple forms of personhood, at worst they
might induce sedition or threats to “public health.” By the mid-20th
century, the spirit possessed began to become legally recognizable, as
not wholly unlike other variables of identity like claims of insanity, or
uncontrollable rage. This happened via the relative social prestige and
racial whiteness of Spiritism, a technique of mediumship arrived from
France. Some argue that spirit mediums have moved from being prosecuted (as in the case of Juca Rosa, 1871) to being protected, and even
solicited by prosecutors as persuasive witnesses.
In present day Brazil, the phenomenon of spirit-testimonies presented in court raises fresh questions on the need to more precisely
stipulate boundaries of legal personhood. But how to do so remains as
fraught and uncertain as the interior lives of legal subjects themselves-traversed by spectral hues of motive, mood, intent, and memory; not
to mention a veritable crowd of extrahuman voices and guides.

